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THE PATH TO PRECLUSION: FEDERAL
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST NATIONWIDE
CLASSES IN STATE COURT
KARA M. MOORCROFT
INTRODUCTION
Mass aggregation of claims intensifies the regulatory effect of
adjudication,1 multiplies defendants’ potential liability,2 and reaffirms

Copyright © 2004 by Kara M. Moorcroft.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 192 (2002) (arguing that the class action device delegates
substantive rights to private persons instead of “politically accountable government agencies”);
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through
Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215–18 (2001) (noting the desire of
“entrepreneurial” plaintiffs’ attorneys and “activist” judges to regulate through litigation); see
also WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW AMERICA’S NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 99–128 (2003) (describing how plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to
regulate the gun industry through class action lawsuits). See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER
ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 49–134
(2000) (discussing the “virtues and vices” of class actions).
2. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1997) (likening
class certification to judicial “blackmail” because it forces defendants into large settlements,
despite the merits of the case, out of fear that a plaintiff-friendly court or jury will return a
devastating verdict (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
120 (1973))); see also Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy
Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1696–97 (1998) (“Even the question of the
defendants’ liability, which should be a critical matter in the fashioning of a just solution,
becomes submerged beneath the overwhelming volume of claims and the huge transactional
costs of defending them.”); Judith Resnick et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 n.31 (1996) (arguing that
aggregation “enables some plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak if not false claims in sufficient
quantity as to require defendants to choose between settlement and bankruptcy”); cf. Bruce L.
Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1399–1404 (2000) (proposing multiple, averaged
trials to avoid the blackmail problem). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (rejecting the notion that class
actions resemble blackmail and urging judges to refrain from using such “inflammatory
rhetoric”).
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3
the redistributive goals of civil litigation. Given the importance of
certification decisions, it is not surprising that reformers have targeted
not only the substance underlying certification, but also the process of
deciding how and when to certify a class. For example, recent rule
changes have expanded the availability of discovery prior to
certification decisions4 and made interlocutory appeal available.5 In In
re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation
6
(Bridgestone II), the Seventh Circuit undertook perhaps the most
ambitious of these reforms. After ordering decertification of a
nationwide class that a federal district court had certified, the Seventh
Circuit issued an injunction to prevent certification of the same
nationwide class in state court.7 This decision broke new ground,
diverging from the decisions of other courts of appeals and flouting
8
traditional notions of injunctive relief, federalism, and preclusion. In
light of the quagmire that defendants face from dozens of putative
9
nationwide classes, it seems apparent that Judge Frank Easterbrook’s

3. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 522 (1997) (cataloguing criticism of class actions and noting
how “[t]ogether, the combination of undemanding standards for class certification, loose
pleading requirements, and expanded standards of tort liability has transformed the mass tort
class action into a massive tool of redistribution”).
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c), as amended in 2003, requires courts to decide
whether to certify a class “at an early practicable time”—as opposed to “as soon as practicable,”
the requirement before the amendment. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). This expansion of
discovery, as the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules explains, is to be used not to evaluate the
merits of a claim, but rather to “identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented
at trial.” Id. advisory committee’s note. The rule amendment avoids “forcing an artificial and
ultimately wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits discovery.’” Id.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). The rule amendment was adopted in 1998, partly in response to
Judge Richard Posner’s scathing critique of lax class certification standards in In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1298–1300. Linda S. Mullenix, Essay, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule
23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001).
6. 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Bridgestone II]. The Seventh Circuit’s earlier
decision to order decertification of the nationwide class, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire
Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003), is
Bridgestone I. This Note uses similar “I” and “II” labels for other cases, referring to the
certification decision as “I” and the discussion of injunctive relief as “II.”
7. 333 F.3d at 767.
8. See infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions of other courts).
9. This quagmire even led the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to discuss amending
Rule 23 to grant preclusive effect to denials of certification, a solution that largely would have
paralleled the Bridgestone II solution. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; see also
Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee 348–51 (May 20, 2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing rule-based solutions to overlapping class
actions); David F. Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: Perspectives on
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opinion was a bold attempt to provide a much needed solution to the
10
pervasive problem of overlapping putative nationwide classes —
notwithstanding criticism that this attempt was unwarranted.11
This Note analyzes the availability of injunctive relief, such as
that that granted in Bridgestone II, to preclude putative class plaintiffs
and their lawyers from pursuing a nationwide class action in state
court after a federal court has already denied certification. Part I
explains the problems and abuses inherent in class adjudication of
claims and articulates why defendants are beginning to seek this type
of injunctive relief. Part II then introduces the Bridgestone II decision
and explores how other courts and commentators have largely
ignored such a remedy. Finally, Part III critically assesses the
doctrinal justifications for these injunctions by examining whether a
denial of certification meets the requirements for issue preclusion.
When a certification denial is interpreted in its proper constitutional
context, it necessarily involves the same issues as any future
certification decision—regardless of the liberality of any state court
class action rule.12 This constitutional context, combined with the
availability of interlocutory appeal for certification decisions, enables
federal courts to enjoin putative class members from relitigating the
certification decision in state court.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH AGGREGATIVE CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions have drawn considerable praise: commentators
explain that they “correct the systematic bias that favors defendants
13
over plaintiffs in mass tort cases” and make viable negative value

Rule 23 Including the Problem of Overlapping Classes (May 7, 2002), in Advisory Comm. on
the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, at 302, 315 (proposing solutions to the problem of
“overlapping class actions in state courts”).
10. This Note uses the term “nationwide classes” to refer to any type of class action
involving plaintiffs in a large number of states. For purposes of this Note, the distinction
between a nationwide class and a multistate class, for example, stemming from the sale of gas
leases in eleven states, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985), is
negligible. The burdens on defendants and benefits for forum-shopping plaintiffs, see infra Part
I, apply equally whether the actions are just multistate or fully nationwide.
11. See Gary Young, Class Action ‘Tort Reform’ Ruling, NAT’L L.J., July 7, 2003, at P5
(noting that the decision “bowled over attorneys with its sweeping—and, some say,
wrongheaded—curtailment of state court authority to certify nationwide classes after a federal
court has declined to do so”).
12. See infra notes 114–37 and accompanying text.
13. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 414 (2000).
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claims that otherwise would not be brought in court. Nonetheless,
class actions often do more harm than good. Aggregation of claims
sacrifices procedural fairness,15 whereas case-by-case adjudication of
16
liability or damages gives litigants their proverbial day in court.
Further, class actions often do more than merely aggregate:
“[S]ometimes they also distort the outcomes by imposing liabilities
that are, when the transformations of substance and procedure are
taken into account, far more onerous than a rule of simple
17
multiplication will provide.” Finally, regulation through litigation
neglects important democratic interests, as the “mini-legislation
effected by class settlements must remain on a plane below that of
duly enacted legislation precisely because class settlements do not
entail anything approaching the degree of consensus demanded of
legislation.”18 Fundamentally, the larger debate over class actions
implicates the debate over the proper role of courts; if it is
undemocratic for judges to expand law beyond the proper contours of

14. A negative value claim is one for which the cost of litigation would exceed the
plaintiff’s potential recovery. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (explaining that class actions allow
plaintiffs to pool claims that are too expensive to bring individually).
15. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
432 (2001) (“Class action lawsuits deprive individuals of their own day in court. They wrest from
each class member her own freedom in undertaking, or avoiding, litigation.”).
16. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 69, 74 (“Underlying our tradition of individual claim autonomy in substantial tort cases is
the natural law notion that this is an important personal right of the individual.”).
17. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 478. Professor Victor Schwartz and his coauthors also explain how
aggregation often benefits plaintiffs:
Evidence indicates that the aggregation of claims increases both the likelihood that a
defendant will be found liable and the size of any damages award which may result.
Defendants are far more likely to be found liable in cases with large numbers of
plaintiffs than in cases involving one or just a few plaintiffs. In addition, juries tend to
treat all plaintiffs alike, regardless of their individual circumstances, so that the
presence of one severely injured plaintiff will likely increase the damages awarded to
all.
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Essay, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call
for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 491–92
(2000) (footnotes omitted). Certification of a class has been said to turn a $20,000 case into a
$200 million dispute, see Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001), and
leave the fate of an entire industry in the hands of a single jury, see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. Nagareda, supra note 1, at 198.
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a statute or constitution, it is even more undemocratic for a single
19
court to dictate policy for the entire country.
This uneasiness with aggregative litigation is magnified when the
20
system is abused, as it often is. The problems inherent in the current
system are many, but this Note emphasizes those problems that
underlie injunctions against the certification of nationwide classes,
dividing them into two distinct but overlapping categories: problems
with multiple putative classes and problems with state court
adjudication of nationwide classes.
A. Multiple Putative Classes
Although duplicative litigation over issues of liability and
damages is often warranted because it is procedurally more fair than
aggregative litigation, having multiple courts decide the issue of
whether aggregation is preferable offers no advantages. Multiple
certification decisions merely waste already scarce judicial resources
and cause needless friction between courts.21 As one commentator
notes, such duplicative litigation “is patently wasteful. . . . [and]
22
smacks of an indefensible gamesmanship.”
19. Cf. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J.
27, 32 (2003) (explaining how judges “strain the boundaries of their institutional abilities” when
they ignore their traditional judicial role by, for example, approving a class action settlement).
20. For a small sample of works criticizing the use of the class action device, see generally
Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of
Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 243 (2001); Resnick et al.,
supra note 2; and Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1. For a good general bibliography of class
action literature, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 915 n.2 (1998).
21. See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention
Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1994) (“Such gross inefficiency is bound to cause
friction, as one court finds itself the loser in a race to judgment, its resources squandered.”);
Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee 105 (May 14, 2001), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2001.pdf (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The prospect that another court may certify the class may impel
a federal court to grant a certification that otherwise would be withheld, believing that it is
better to maintain control of a dubious class than to stand by helpless while another court
pursues the same class to judgment.”); Levi, supra note 9, at 311 (noting that as federal courts
become more deliberate and managerial in certifying classes or approving settlements, “an ever
growing number of cases will be filed in those state courts where this kind of supervision is
perceived to be less demanding,” often resulting in “multiple filings of multistate diversity class
actions in both federal and state courts. . . . precisely the outcome that the class action device
was designed to prevent”).
22. Rehnquist, supra note 21, at 1064; cf. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative
Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigation Unit,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 832–33 (1989) (noting that because “[c]ourts are a public resource . . . .
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An even greater harm of multiple certification decisions is the
harm beset upon defendants forced to face litigation that they can
lose but never win. Professor Martin Redish extends this certification
“blackmail” argument to include even threats of certification:
A defendant is aware that its success in opposing class certification
in 1, 2, or even 50 different courts would not preclude a 51st court
from granting certification. The defendant thus must face the
possibility of a constant stream of harassing filings. Hence,
defendants are effectively forced to “buy” litigation peace, even
23
where such payments are wholly undeserved, by settling.

In many cases, defendants and plaintiffs will spend two or three years
battling over the initial certification decision in federal court. Fighting
this same battle in multiple state courts, after it was fully and fairly
24
litigated in the original federal forum, is fundamentally unfair.
B. State Court Adjudication of Nationwide Class Actions
Although experimentation with rules, standards of liability, and
even entire social schemes may demonstrate the beauty of
25
federalism, such rules, standards, and schemes in the nationwide

we have a right to insist that their services not be squandered” and arguing that the “duplication
of effort is a major cause of the protraction of time needed to resolve cases and cannot be
justified by plaintiffs’ selfish strategic desire”).
23. Martin H. Redish, The Need for Jurisdictional and Structural Class Action Reform, 32
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,984, 10,985 (2002); cf. David Hechler, GC’s Nightmare: EEOC
Class Actions Are Up 43% Since 1997, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 29, 2002, at A19 (“Consumer products
companies that depend on public goodwill are particularly vulnerable to bad public relations
and may settle even before classes are certified . . . .”).
24. See In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir.
1977):
There are strong arguments that may be advanced for applying the rule of collateral
estoppel to a class action determination when the plaintiff is engaging in multidistrict
litigation. First, the evidence adduced in a fair hearing generally requires a substantial
investment in discovery. A significant amount of judicial time is likely to be consumed
in considering both the evidence amassed and the legal arguments arrayed in support
of and in opposition to class action status. Second, assuming a fair hearing, a plaintiff
ought not to have unlimited bites at the apple until he can convince a single district
court that he qualifies as a class representative under Rule 23. This is wasteful and
runs counter to the sound administration of multi-district cases. Third, the parties and
the issues in the individual cases will normally be of sufficient similarity that a factual
determination in a fair hearing should be conclusive in companion cases on principles
of collateral estoppel.
Without the availability of the certification-blocking injunction, plaintiffs will continue to get
unlimited bites at the certification apple.
25. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
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class action context necessarily impose individual state values on the
entire country. The purpose of federalism was never to allow a single
local judge and jury to impose its decision on the rest of an unwilling
nation. State court adjudication of class actions represents the worst
of forum shopping with perverse effects: plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions result in easy certifications, big verdicts, and settlements
26
larger than warranted.
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has made clear that a
state court can adjudicate a nationwide class action—even of
exclusively federal claims—that will have binding effect on class
members who do not opt out, as long as the court meets certain
27
constitutional notice requirements. Choice of law, however, provides
an important constitutional limitation on the adjudication of
nationwide classes.28 Without significant aggregation of contacts to
the class claims, the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of
29
the U.S. Constitution prevent the forum state from applying its own
30
law.
This jurisprudence—allowing state court adjudication of
nationwide classes—is ripe for abuse because of the slim chance that

citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
26. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of
It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 153 (2001) (“What business does a state
court judge elected by the several thousand residents of a small county in Alabama have in
telling the state of Massachusetts what its laws mean?”).
27. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369, 372–73 (1996)
(confirming the “preclusive effect of a state-court judgment, entered in a class or derivative
action, that provides for the release of exclusively federal claims”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806–14 (1986) (holding that a state court had personal jurisdiction over
absent class members who had limited or no contacts with the forum as long as it had met
procedural notice and opt-out requirements).
28. See infra notes 121–37 and accompanying text; cf. RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 410 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he proper handling of choice-of-law
issues in class actions remains somewhat unsettled. Shutts provides some outside constitutional
limits, but there is limited choice-of-law doctrine to assist courts in navigating within those
limits.”).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
30. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13
(1981)).
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the Supreme Court will review state court decisions. For example, in
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,32 an Illinois
appellate court upheld a county court’s application of Illinois law
33
across a nationwide class certified against State Farm. The Avery
court held that an Illinois consumer fraud statute reached insurance
transactions across the country.34 The jury had found State Farm
liable for using generic automobile replacement parts in forty-eight
35
states, even though several states had encouraged the practice to
drive down consumer costs of insurance.36 After business groups,
consumer advocates, and regulatory agencies exerted enormous
37
pressure, the Illinois Supreme Court granted appellate review. As of
38
this writing, however, it has failed to issue a decision, leaving other
Illinois courts with the precedent that the Illinois Consumer Fraud
39
Act extends to “protect” consumers across the entire United States.
Although it is questionable whether Avery could survive U.S.
40
Supreme Court review, its implications have already been felt across
41
the country. The Avery court’s decision is but one of many examples
of the perverse effects of state court adjudication of nationwide class
actions. In the past several years, a single court in Madison County,

31. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 224 (2001) (noting that the
Court grants certiorari in about one hundred cases each year, chosen from more than seven
thousand petitions).
32. 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), appeal granted, 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002). For a
powerful critique of Avery, see generally Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1.
33. Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1257.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1261.
36. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 1230 & nn. 59–61 for a listing of statutes that
discuss insurance company use of generic parts.
37. Avery, 786 N.E.2d at 180.
38. The Illinois Supreme Court granted review in October 2002 and heard arguments in
May 2003, Daniel C. Vock, High Court Urged to Void $1 Billion Judgment, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 14, 2003, at 1, but as of October 20, 2004, had yet to rule.
39. See Clark v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 798 N.E.2d 123, 129, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(noting that Avery was “precedent to which [it was] bound” and determining that the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act applied, “abrogating the need to apply the laws of all 50 states”).
40. See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treatser, Generic Car Parts Makers Fighting Back, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2000, at C8 (describing how sales of generic car parts dropped after the Illinois decision); cf.
Joseph L. Bast, Editorial, Three Cheers—And a Sigh of Relief—For Boeing, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
May 17, 2001, at 33 (“Allowing certification of national classes whenever an Illinois corporation
is accused of violating an Illinois law sanctions jackpot justice, with lawyers flocking to Illinois
courts to make a quick buck by threatening multibillion-dollar lawsuits over business practices
that are perfectly legal, and sometimes even required, in other states.”).
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Illinois has certified dozens of class actions, many of them
42
nationwide.
Even conceding that class actions serve a useful regulatory
43
function, state courts with inherently local concerns should not force
their regulatory preferences upon the entire United States, especially
when a federal court has already decided that a class action is not
appropriate.44 The probable lack of Supreme Court review of these
state court adjudications only exacerbates the problems inherent in
allowing local courts to make policy for the country.

42. See, e.g., LESTER BRINKMAN, ANATOMY OF A MADISON COUNTY (ILLINOIS) CLASS
ACTION: A STUDY OF PATHOLOGY 6–7 (Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute,
Civil Justice Report No. 6, 2002) (using Madison County as indicative of how plaintiffs’ lawyers
have countered federal court class action scrutiny “by filing their would-be class actions in state
court jurisdictions where judges are known or believed to be likely to act favorably toward
plaintiffs’ counsel and where juries have a high propensity for favoring claimants over out-ofstate ‘big business’ defendants”), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr_6.htm;
Noam Neusner, The Judges of Madison County, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 39
(“With a population of 258,941, Madison County has hosted 50 class action lawsuits so far this
year, up from 39 the prior year.”); see also Beisner & Miller, supra note 26, at 185 (reviewing
class actions filed in Madison County to conclude that judges there have been asked “to set
national policy on issues that could affect the daily lives of millions of Americans throughout
the country—from what water they drink to how much they pay for their next insurance policy
or telephone bill—all from a small courthouse in southwest Illinois”). Madison County has
acquired celebrity status on the editorial page and in congressional hearings. See, e.g., 149
CONG. REC. H5281 (daily ed. June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (discussing
how “the only explanation for this phenomenon [the explosion of litigation in Madison County]
is aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing
accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and setting policy for the entire
country in a local court”); Editorial, Mayhem in Madison County, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2002, at
A14 (discussing filings in Madison County as indicative of how “forum-shopping for class
actions now has damaging nationwide economic consequences”).
43. This concession is quite debatable. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra note 9, at 327 (“[N]o lawyer should be able to march into court on behalf of
millions of clients and ask a judge down in Plaquemine in Louisiana to decide that some
pharmaceutical ingredient is harmful. I mean, that’s a job for the FDA.” (reporting the
comments of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Esq.)).
44. See Beisner & Miller, supra note 26, at 205 (arguing that many nationwide class actions
“are being heard by locally elected county judges, . . . who are often viewed by plaintiffs’
lawyers as willing to ‘rubber stamp’ class certification orders and ‘coupon’ settlements, and who
are periodically forced to turn to the local bar to fund their efforts at re-election”); Levi, supra
note 9, at 314 (“Individual state courts may properly apply the policy choices of the residents of
that state to those residents. But local authorities ought not impose those local choices upon
other states and certainly not on a nationwide basis.”).
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II. THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD ENJOINING
NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules long ago recognized the
problems of overlapping putative class actions and considered a rule
amendment that would have given preclusive effect to a refusal to
certify so that no other court could certify a rejected class.45 The
Advisory Committee received many comments on the proposed
amendment,46 but it ultimately decided that the amendment would be
47
too substantive and thus would violate the Rules Enabling Act.
Courts, however, do not face such limitations and should, under
appropriate circumstances, use their statutory and inherent powers to
enjoin plaintiffs from pursuing certification of nationwide classes.48
Although some courts have considered another court’s denial of
49
certification when analyzing whether a class is maintainable, most
courts have refused to grant preclusive effect to earlier denials of
certification.50 For example, Tennessee courts have certified

45. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, at 40:
A court that refuses to certify—or decertifies—a class for failure to satisfy the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(1) or (2), or for failure to satisfy the standards of Rule
23(b)(1), (2), or (3), may direct that no other court may certify a substantially similar
class to pursue substantially similar claims, issues, or defenses unless a difference of
law or change of fact creates a new certification issue.
(quoting proposed Rule 23(c)(1)(D)). The committee explains that the possibilities for “abuse
presented by unfettered opportunities to present the same class action to a different court . . .
support a procedural mechanism permitting a court denying certification to make that denial
binding on a subsequent, sufficiently similar, proposed class.” Id. at 34.
46. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 320–37
(summarizing comments).
47. See Levi, supra note 9, at 315 (discussing the Rules Advisory Committee’s desire to
provide more than “modest benefits” by addressing “overlapping class actions in state court,”
but noting how “[t]here may be room to adopt valid rules provisions in the face of these
[Enabling Act and other] objections, but to do so might test the limits of rulemaking authority
thus inviting litigation over the rules themselves”).
48. This power stems from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), which states that
courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Syngenta Corp.
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002), does not affect a court’s injunctive power, only its removal
power.
49. See Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 822 (S.D. Ga. 1987) (giving preclusive
effect to an earlier court’s denial of certification of a substantially similar class); In re Dalkon
Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Va. 1985) (giving preclusive effect
to the decertification of a class).
50. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Deere
Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1994). The difficulties of overlapping classes
illustrate this problem further. Even if a court did not expressly discuss the preclusion problem
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51
nationwide classes without giving any notice to defendants; a
Louisiana trial court has approved a settlement for a class deemed
unfair by both a federal court and another state court;52 and a county
court in western Illinois has certified classes deemed uncertifiable just
53
about anywhere else. Given the procertification bent of some state

when certifying a class, it should be aware of earlier denials of certification or the existence of
an outstanding certified class. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), is
representative of the worst of this phenomenon; the court actually noted that another court had
denied a motion to certify a nationwide class action, but it failed to discuss the implications of
this denial. Id. at 155 n.14.
51. Schwartz et al, supra note 17, describe one such certification:
In a lawsuit filed against a major automobile manufacturer in a Tennessee state court,
plaintiffs filed several inches of documents with their complaint. By the end of the
same day the lawsuit was filed, the court certified a nationwide class of 23 million
automobile owners—one of the largest class actions ever certified by any court. In its
certification order, the court stated that it had conducted a “probing, rigorous review”
of the matter, a practical impossibility given the few hours allotted the review and the
utter lack of thoughtful response to the plaintiff’s motion.
Id. at 501–02 (footnotes omitted). The authors further argue that this ex parte certification
“offends notions of due process and fundamental fairness” because “it can be very much an
uphill battle for the defendant to change the judge’s mind after the fact.” Id. at 502. Before a
change in court composition, Alabama was also infamous for ex parte certifications. See Linda
S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class
Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1718 (2000) (“[I]n a forum that liberally granted
class certification to almost every case in which it was requested, the Alabama Supreme Court
has engaged, in the last eighteen months, in an astonishing reversal of class certification
decisions.”); Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 499 (“[O]ver a recent two-year period, a state
court in rural Alabama certified almost as many class actions (thirty-five cases) as all 900 federal
district courts did in a year (thirty-eight cases)). See generally OLSON, supra note 1, at 231–32
(describing “drive-by” certifications in Alabama and Tennessee).
52. See White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480, 491 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing and
remanding the trial court’s decision to approve a settlement class); White v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
835 So. 2d 892, 901–08 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing the trial court’s decision to approve the
settlement class on remand). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, though refusing to enjoin the
Louisiana settlement after having vacated a similar federal court settlement, criticized the
settlement in a lengthy opinion, explaining that it “was inadequate and unreasonable, and may
even have been a marketing boon” to the defendant. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 (1995); see also id. at 803 (questioning whether
the adequacy of representation requirement could be met when “class counsel effected a
settlement that would yield very substantial rewards to them . . . [for] little work”); Rhonda
Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 465–71 (2000) (discussing the litigation
in detail); infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. A Texas appellate court also found a lower
court’s approval of a similar statewide settlement to constitute abuse of discretion because it
was not “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Bloyed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 426
(Tex. App. 1994).
53. See Neusner, supra note 42, at 39 (“Consider [one case that] alleges that [the
defendant] uses a faulty database to decide appropriate medical treatment and payment for
certain kinds of claims. Similar cases have been filed across the country, all seeking nationwide
class action status. None succeeded before, but in Madison [County], one did.”); see also supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
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courts, a system in which courts would honor (by giving preclusive
effect to) other courts’ denials of certification might be an
54
improvement but seems unlikely to come about.
Thus, given the unlikelihood of a rule amendment and courts’
reluctance to give preclusive effects to denials of certification, the
only nonlegislative way to prevent relitigation of a certification
decision is by injunction. This Part discusses defendants’ efforts to
obtain such injunctions, culminating in Bridgestone II, in which the
Seventh Circuit enjoined putative class plaintiffs from pursuing a
nationwide class action in state court.
A. Avoiding the Anti-Injunction Act: Enjoining Competing Classes
Because an injunction is a “highly intrusive remedy,” traditional
principles of comity, federalism, and equity counsel that federal
courts exercise hesitation before so intruding upon state court
matters.55 The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) codifies this unwillingness
to intrude into state matters by forbidding a federal court from
56
issuing an injunction unless it falls within one of three exceptions.
Preventing “needless friction” between federal and state courts
57
justifies the AIA and its presumption against injunctive relief.
Much has been written concerning the availability of federal
58
court injunctive relief in the class action context. The problems of

54. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 326
(“Another approach would be to encourage the states to enact similar, parallel, or reciprocal
rules; but there is reason to be concerned that not all states will go along—particularly the states
that are more likely to permit improvident certification.” (reporting the comments of Thomas
Y. Allman, Esq.)); Levi, supra note 9, at 317 (noting the need for expanded federal subject
matter jurisdiction because “[i]t is very difficult for any single state court to fairly resolve these
problems, and nearly as difficult for state courts to act together in shifting ad hoc arrangements
for cooperation”).
55. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1985).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”).
57. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232 (1970) (quoting Okla. Packing Co. v. Gas & Elec.
Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939)). This presumption is so strong that the Supreme Court has cautioned
that the exceptions to the AIA should not be “enlarged by loose statutory construction,” Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988). Further, “doubts as to the propriety of a
federal injunction against state court proceedings” should be resolved against issuing the
injunction. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970).
58. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 52 (reviewing exhaustively the law and policy
surrounding competing classes); Andrew S. Weinstein, Note, Avoiding the Race to Res Judicata:
Federal Antisuit Injunctions of Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085 (2000)
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competing class actions are well known: they waste judicial resources,
confuse class members receiving multiple notices of suit, and may
59
create a “race to the bottom” favoring settlement. These negative
implications of overlapping class actions, particularly actions filed in
what have been termed “drive-by” certification courts on the eve of a
federal settlement,60 necessitated an expansion of the use of
61
injunctions to prevent these overlapping classes. This type of
injunctive relief—prohibiting another class action from proceeding
when a federal court is close to settlement—typically falls under the
“necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the AIA, and even
this exception is not without criticism.62
Curiously, though, the commentary regarding this type of
injunctive relief, what this Note calls the “settlement-protecting
injunction,” does not seriously consider the possibility of enjoining
future class actions when no class action is or will be pending in the
given federal forum. For example, a leading treatise discusses only
whether the court can force litigants into a “particular federal class

(arguing for an expansion of the use of antisuit injunctions against competing state class
actions); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996)
(discussing the problems of duplicative filings in large-scale litigation); cf. 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4425, at 531–33 & n.11
(2d ed. 2002) (“A good argument can be made that . . . it should be permissible for a federal
court to enjoin state proceedings that would interfere with efficient disposition of a federal class
action.”). See generally Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and
Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 925
(discussing an American Law Institute proposal for expanded use of antisuit injunctions in the
“transfer-removal-consolidation scheme” and how it could be extended to class actions).
59. Weinstein, supra note 58, at 1085.
60. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 501.
61. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding an
injunction preventing the plaintiffs from prosecuting a putative class in state court “[g]iven the
concerns of the district court to finalize the settlement and given the time invested in reaching
that goal”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding a
settlement-protecting injunction); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332,
1335 (5th Cir. 1981) (same). For a good overview of the subject, see In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation, 282 F.3d 220, 233–
40 (3d Cir. 2002), and the sources mentioned in note 58, supra.
62. See, e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180–84 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating a
district court order that certified a mandatory class and prohibited the plaintiffs from litigating
punitive damage claims in state courts, on the ground that the order violated the AIA); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910 (1987) (“Although federal
courts may try to limit the proliferation of parallel actions by enjoining plaintiffs from bringing
suit in state court or by staying state discovery proceedings, the Anti-Injunction Act denies
federal courts the power to stay preexisting state actions.”).
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63
action forum.” This view presumes that the court issuing an
injunction (or other type of remedy for defendants) has already
certified a class action. Professor Linda Wasserman’s lengthy article
on dueling class actions spends just two paragraphs on what this Note
calls the “certification-blocking injunction,”64 concluding that “the
protections and limitations built into preclusion doctrine . . . provide
litigants with opportunities to ‘repackage’ class actions rejected by
one court and file them in another court.”65 Other scholarly works do
not even mention certification-blocking injunctions, focusing instead
66
on the settlement-protecting injunction.
In the cases discussed in Sections B and C, however, defendants
sought injunctions remarkably different from the settlementprotecting injunctions that courts typically grant: they sought to
enjoin future class actions when no class action was currently
proceeding in federal court. Instead of asking for protection from a
competing class action in a different forum, defendants asked federal
courts to help them avoid lengthy rounds of litigation in other forums
over the certification decision already litigated. In Bridgestone II, for
example, the defendants asked the Seventh Circuit to issue an
injunction preventing certification of any class related to the
67
litigation.

B. Early Rejections
Nearly a decade ago, the Fifth Circuit declined to enjoin state
courts from certifying a class that the district court had refused to
68
certify. The court remarked, “While we are sympathetic to [the
defendant’s] desire to avoid another protracted and costly round of

63. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1798.1,
at 435 (2d ed. 1986).
64. The term “certification-blocking” encompasses both denials of certification and
decertifications, although there may be a distinct analysis of the two. It is beyond the scope of
this Note to discuss the circumstances, if any, under which a district court’s decertification is
entitled to less preclusive effect than an appellate court’s decertification.
65. Wasserman, supra note 52, at 487–88. In discussing injunctions issued on the basis of
the relitigation exception to the AIA, Professor Wasserman notes the apparent lack of finality
of certification decisions before the addition of subsection (f)—providing for interlocutory
appeal—to Rule 23 in 1998, id. at 516 n.289, but concludes that the “utility of such an injunction
. . . is quite limited, and even when available, may be ‘too little, too late,’” id. at 516–17.
66. None of the sources in note 58, supra, mentions the potential use of certificationblocking injunctions, except to the extent discussed above.
67. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003).
68. J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996).
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litigation over class certification . . . the Anti-Injunction Act requires
69
a different result.” In a short discussion, the court concluded that an
order denying certification lacked finality because it was not likely
70
appealable and was therefore not a final judgment. This lack of
finality, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, placed the certification decision
outside the scope of the relitigation exception to the AIA, which is
grounded in principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.71
On much the same reasoning, the Third Circuit refused to grant
72
an injunction to prevent relitigation of a certification decision. The
Third Circuit had earlier vacated the district court’s order to both
certify a nationwide class and approve a proposed settlement.73 In
refusing to intervene in a state court’s certification of a nearly
identical class, the court noted that state courts were not bound by
federal interpretations of Rule 23 and could certify nationwide classes
74
according to state law standards.
Both of these courts relied heavily on finality and appealibity
considerations; before 1998, interlocutory appeal was not available
for certification decisions. Yet even after certification decisions
became appealable, a defendant’s potential remedy of enjoining
putative plaintiffs from pursuing certification in another forum after
75
an earlier denial remained elusive until Bridgestone II.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. (“Because finality is central to the ‘concepts of both res judicata and collateral
estoppel,’ which animate the Anti-Injunction Act, such a lack of finality is also fatal to a request
for injunction under the Act.” (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147
(1988))).
72. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133,
146 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter GM II] (“[D]enial of class certification under these
circumstances lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive effect.”).
73. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter GM I].
74. See GM II, 134 F.3d at 146 (“[O]ur construction of Rule 23 and application to the
provisional settlement class is not controlling on the Louisiana court.”).
75. See Young, supra note 11 (“[Bridgestone II] is the first time a federal court has said that
the denial of certification has a preclusive effect on state court proceedings.” (quoting class
action defense attorney John Beisner)). In 2000, the Eighth Circuit enjoined plaintiffs from
bringing state court class claims premised on identical “factual allegations” and “the same issues
as a case dismissed without prejudice in federal court.” Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d
1005, 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2000). Although resulting in an injunction resembling the one issued
in Bridgestone II, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning focused not on the finality of the certification
decision but instead on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing in the case. Id. at 1015. Indeed, the court
cited in dictum the cases discussed in Part II.B of this Note and stated: “We recognize that
denial of class certification alone does not constitute a final judgment on the merits sufficient to
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C. Bridgestone II: The Perfect Test Case?
In May 2003, the Seventh Circuit issued the Bridgestone II
opinion, surprising many commentators with its willingness to enjoin
plaintiffs from pursuing any type of nationwide class action.76 Yet the
remedy was hardly shocking, given the startling facts surrounding the
massive litigation. Regulators ordered the recall of more than ten
million tires after tread separation on the tires was linked to accidents
causing 271 deaths and more than 700 injuries.77 Ford and
Bridgestone/Firestone settled hundreds of personal injury lawsuits
78
stemming from these rollovers and tire blowouts. Groups of
plaintiffs’ attorneys also filed consumer actions in at least twentyseven different federal districts on behalf of individuals whose tires
had not malfunctioned.79

satisfy the res judicata principles underlying the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act.” Id. at 1018–19 n.9. This distinction can no longer be good law. The Canady court removed
the lawsuits filed in state court pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), a
practice that the Supreme Court later foreclosed in Syngenta Corp. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33
(2002). Now that such removal is improper, the Canady approach is not viable. Federal courts
cannot enjoin state proceedings on the basis of standing alone because state courts can, without
infringing upon the Constitution, “issue advisory opinions or . . . determine matters that would
not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts that an actual ‘case’ or
‘controversy’ be presented for resolution.” N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 8 n.2 (1988).
76. See, e.g., Recent Case, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (2004) (“Though perhaps wellintentioned, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling diverges too far from fundamental legal and
constitutional principles . . . .”); Young, supra note 11 (noting how the case “bowled over
attorneys with its sweeping—and, some say, wrongheaded—curtailment of state court authority
to certify nationwide classes after a federal court has declined to do so”).
77. E.g., Caroline E. Mayer & Carrie Johnson, Firestone to Recall More Tires, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at E1; cf. ADAM PENENBERG, TRAGIC INDIFFERENCE: ONE MAN’S BATTLE
WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY OVER THE DANGERS OF SUVS (2003) (telling a story of the tire
litigation from the perspective of one plaintiff’s personal injury lawyer).
78. E.g., Alison Gregor, Tire Trial: Settlement in McAllen, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Aug. 25, 2001, at A1. Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone chose to litigate other suits, such as a
Nebraska wrongful death suit filed when a woman was abducted and killed after her Ford
Explorer’s Firestone tires failed, leaving her “alone and stranded.” See Stahlecker v. Ford
Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Neb. 2003); id. at 257 (upholding the dismissal of the lawsuit
because the “criminal assault constituted an efficient intervening cause which precludes a
determination that negligence on the part of Ford [or] Firestone was the proximate cause of the
harm which occurred”).
79. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II & Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1373, 2000 WL 33416573, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 24, 2000). The MDL order noted that one of
the purposes of federal court consolidation is to “prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings
(particularly with respect to overlapping class certification requests).” Id.
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After these actions were consolidated, the reviewing district
court, sitting in Indiana, certified a nationwide class involving more
than sixty million tires, three million vehicles, and sixty-seven tire
80
design specifications, concluding that Indiana choice-of-law analysis
would apply a single state’s law to the entire class.81 The Seventh
Circuit reversed and ordered the class decertified, holding it “so
unwieldy . . . that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a
price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if
not more than, the actual merit of the claims.”82 The Supreme Court
later denied certiorari, closing a two-year battle over certification in
83
the MDL proceeding.
Almost immediately after the Seventh Circuit ordered the class
decertified, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed similar lawsuits in a number of
state courts. “One state judge certified a nationwide class on the day
[that the] complaint was filed, without awaiting a response from the
84
defendants and without giving reasons.” When the defendants
petitioned the district court for injunctive relief, Judge Sarah Evans
Barker dismissed the request on just the moving papers, calling such
relief “extraordinary” and “unprecedented.”85 The Seventh Circuit
80. The numbers concerning the scope of the class are drawn from the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002).
81. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., ATX, ATX II and Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab.
Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 513 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
82. Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d at 1016.
83. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). The Court denied
certiorari on January 13, 2003. Id. Plaintiffs first sought class certification in the MDL
proceeding on February 2, 2001. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., ATX, ATX II and Wilderness
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 516.
84. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003). The district court later identified this
case as Davison v. Ford Motor Co., No. 00-C2298 (8th Cir. Ct. of Tenn. 2000), and held it within
the scope of the Seventh Circuit’s certification-blocking injunction. See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373, at 1
(S.D. Ind. July 18, 2003) (clarifying notice in aid of the injunction of July 18, 2003). This
document and all of the district court’s orders cited in this Note are available online at the
Southern District of Indiana’s website, http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/default.htm,
which features a searchable database of the MDL docket and other helpful information about
the litigation.
85. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S, MDL No.
1373, at 2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2003) (order denying motion to enjoin class proceedings). The
district judge commented that “the flaws in [the defendants’] position are obvious and many,”
id. at 3, noting that “it should have been perfectly obvious” that other class actions would be
filed in state courts, id. at 7, and that the defendants relied on an “assertion that . . . plainly
rest[ed] on a mischaracterization of the bounds of the Seventh Circuit’s decision [in Bridgestone
I],” id. at 4. The district judge refused the defendants’ injunction on the moving papers alone,
without briefing, promptly finding “no basis for granting this extraordinary” relief. Id. at 2.
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then partially reversed Judge Barker, issuing an injunction to prevent
putative plaintiffs and their lawyers from pursuing certification of a
86
nationwide class. The Seventh Circuit noted that litigants still could
bring individual suits and statewide classes but just could not
87
“represent a national class of others similarly situated.”
Focusing on the negative policy implications of multiple
certification battles, Judge Frank Easterbrook noted that refusing to
issue an injunction gave plaintiffs a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose”
88
advantage. “A single positive [the one judge who will certify a
nationwide class] trumps all the negatives [the many judges who
refuse to certify].”89 The Seventh Circuit justified its order to issue a
certification-blocking injunction on the basis of the relitigation
exception to the AIA, holding that its decertification in Bridgestone I
was “sufficiently firm” to warrant the preclusive effect of an
90
injunction.
III. THE DOCTRINAL VALIDITY OF FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST PUTATIVE CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT
As an unprecedented decision, Bridgestone II may be an
anomaly in class action jurisprudence.91 This Note argues, however,
that to prevent state courts from intruding into properly federal
matters and unfairly burdening defendants, federal courts can and
should issue certification-blocking injunctions in appropriate
circumstances.
As discussed in Part II, courts have used the “necessary in aid of
jurisdiction” exception to the AIA to enjoin competing class actions
92
through the settlement-protecting injunction. In these cases, a
federal court already has certified a nationwide class or is close to
approving a settlement, and then issues an injunction against state

86. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 769.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 767.
89. Id.
90. Id. Barring a successful collateral attack, the Bridgestone/Firestone consumer claims
class litigation concluded in July 2003 when a Texas state court approved and certified a
nationwide settlement class at the defendants’ request. See, e.g., Myron Levin, Tire Maker to
Add Safety Features to Settle Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A-26 (noting that the settlement
included a $19 million payout to the plaintiffs’ lawyers and a $15 million consumer education
plan).
91. See supra Part II.B (discussing cases in which courts refused to issue such injunctions).
92. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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interference with that settlement. By contrast, the “necessary in aid of
jurisdiction” exception would not cover the certification-blocking
injunction. Because the court issuing the injunction does not wish to
exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class, the court has no
jurisdiction in need of aid.
The relitigation exception to the AIA, by which a federal court
may enjoin state court proceedings “to protect or effectuate its
judgments,” provided the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s certification93
blocking injunction in Bridgestone II. The relitigation exception,
which the Supreme Court has admonished federal courts to invoke
with restraint, was “designed to permit a federal court to prevent
state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and
decided by the federal court” and “is founded in the well-recognized
concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”94 Therefore, if a
decision is entitled to preclusive effect, a court can properly issue an
injunction over the issue that it already decided.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is established when a
court actually and necessarily litigates an issue between parties to a
95
final judgment. Therefore, for a certification decision to qualify for
preclusive effect, the decision must meet the following criteria: a) it
must be sufficiently final, b) it must decide the same issue as the issue
to be enjoined, and c) it must be actually and necessarily decided.
Courts must also consider the timing of injunctions. This Part explains
the circumstances under which a denial of certification will meet all of
these requirements.
A. Finality of the Certification Denial
As mentioned in Part II.B, the earlier rejections of certificationblocking injunctions could be said to rest on lack of interlocutory
appeal. When an order cannot be appealed, it can hardly be called a
“sufficiently firm” judgment that warrants federal court protection.
The recent adoption of Rule 23(f), however, made class certification
an appealable order; thus, the certification decision seems “final”
enough for purposes of the relitigation exception.

93. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 765 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000)). For a good history of
the relitigation exception to the AIA, see George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act:
Fending Off the New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 NEB. L. REV. 643 (1993).
94. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (“[C]ollateral estoppel treats as
final only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.”).
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A leading treatise, however, cautions that “[t]he relitigation
96
exception generally does not encompass procedural rulings.”
Although generally true, this notion stems primarily from the
practical aspects of seeking this type of injunction. Litigants who lose
most procedural rulings will lack the incentive to start anew in a
different state court because most procedural rulings do not change
the face of litigation as drastically as the certification decision. The
Bridgestone II court noted that the certification decision “determines
the identity of the parties and the stakes of the case,” thus concluding
that “the permissible scope of litigation is as much substantive as it is
procedural.”97 Although Rule 23 is classifiable as “procedural” for the
purposes of which law a federal court applies when sitting in diversity,
the Supreme Court recently noted that “the meaning of ‘substance’
and ‘procedure’ in a particular context is largely determined by the
purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”98
Even before Bridgestone II, a few courts had already enjoined
parties from relitigating procedural issues in other contexts such as
discovery. For example, one circuit court allowed a federal district
court to enjoin plaintiffs from using evidence brought out in discovery
in a state forum, so as “to prevent unnecessary or vexatious
litigation.”99 Another court explained that “the Anti-Injunction Act
does not bar courts with jurisdiction over complex multidistrict
litigation from issuing injunctions to protect the integrity of their
rulings, including pre-trial . . . discovery orders.”100 If decisions
surrounding the proper scope of discovery are sufficiently final for the
purposes of the AIA, by analogy certification decisions must be as
well.

96. 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 121.08[3], at 121-46
(3d ed. 2000).
97. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 768.
98. Jinks v. Richland Co., 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717, 726 (1988)).
99. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1961); see also In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 261 F.3d 355, 368 (3d Cir. 2001) (relying on Sperry to uphold an
injunction preventing the plaintiffs from engaging in discovery).
100. Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1996). The Winkler court
actually reversed the injunction for abuse of discretion, because the district judge had not
reviewed the allegedly privileged document in camera before enjoining the plaintiffs from
pursuing discovery in state court. Id. at 1204. The court explicitly held, however, that the AIA
permits the issuance of injunctions in multidistrict litigation to protect pretrial orders, id. at
1203, and allowed the parties to file for a narrower injunction, id. at 1206.
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Similarly, numerous courts have upheld injunctions against state
proceedings after the federal forum determined that the case should
101
be submitted to arbitration. At their most basic level, injunctions
against both future class certifications and litigation in state forums
after arbitration is ordered are fundamentally the same: a federal
court enjoins a state court from litigating issues after a federal court
determination that such litigation would be improper.
Furthermore, another court has ruled that questions surrounding
the adequacy of representation in the class action context, when
answered in the affirmative, are sufficiently final for the purposes of
102
the relitigation exception to the AIA. The court ruled that opt-out
plaintiffs could be enjoined from pursuing a legal malpractice claim
against class counsel because the court’s decision to approve a class
settlement necessarily entailed a determination that the class counsel
103
adequately represented all interests.
B. Issue Similarity
Assuming that a denial of certification is sufficiently final, the
issues presented before a federal court deciding the certification
question must be the same as the issues in any putative class action
that the court plans to enjoin. In Bridgestone II, the Seventh Circuit
did not discuss this “same issues” requirement, instead relying
exclusively on section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments.104 This section, entitled Requirement of Finality, states
that “for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger
and bar), ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue
in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect.”105 The problem with the Seventh Circuit’s
101. See, e.g., Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
injunction at issue was necessary to protect the district court’s judgment); Kelly v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that federal
courts have the authority to enjoin arbitration to prevent litigation); Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v.
Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1976) (concluding that an injunction was
appropriate to effectuate the district court’s judgment).
102. Thomas v. Powell, 247 F.3d 260, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
103. Id. The opt-out plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that “the class action attorneys ‘sold
out’ their clients” and “engaged in collusive secret negotiations to the detriment of their
clients.” Id. The district court’s decision to approve the class settlement “squarely decided”
these questions, and thus an injunction was appropriate. Id.
104. See Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978)).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978).
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analysis is that the finality requirement is a necessary, but not
sufficient, requirement of issue preclusion. Also required is an actual
and necessary determination of the same issues over which a party
106
later seeks to assert preclusive effect.
1. “Semantic” Differences? Most state class action rules are
modeled after or are identical to Federal Rule 23, at least before its
107
1998 and 2003 amendments. A state court may, however, interpret
its rule differently, even when its rule is identical to Rule 23.108 The
existence of different standards of interpretation led the Second
Circuit to refuse to give preclusive effect to a “state court’s ruling that
[an earlier suit] in that court could not be maintained as a class
109
action.” In doing so, the court recognized that “issues are not
identical when the standards governing them are significantly
different.”110 The Second Circuit focused on the significant differences
between New York’s interpretation of its class action statute, which
required that “the complaint allege a wrong against the class as a
class,” and Federal Rule 23, under which certification “is usually
warranted when individual wrongs are alleged to have been pursuant
to a common plan.”111
This significant difference was the focus of the Second Circuit’s
decision; implicit in the court’s analysis is that minute differences in
interpretation do not destroy issue similarity. Another court

106. See, e.g., id. § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.”); cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (“[C]ollateral estoppel treats as final
only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.”).
107. See Rory Ryan, Note, Uncertifiable?: The Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class
Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 469 n.3 (2002), for a listing of state class action rules and their
similarities and differences to Rule 23.
108. See, e.g., Morgan v. Deere Credit, 889 S.W.2d 360, 367–68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (noting
both the “difference in some of the rules, [and that] those rules that are identical sometimes
have been applied differently by Texas courts” to reject giving preclusive effect to a federal
court class action determination); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1114 n.206 (1996) (“[E]ven if one court rejects class
certification, there is generally no collateral estoppel effect on the ability of a second court in a
different jurisdiction to consider certifying the class.”). GM II, see supra notes 72–74 and
accompanying text, also notes that “our construction of Rule 23 and application to the
provisional settlement class is not controlling on the Louisiana court, because it is not bound by
our interpretation of Rule 23.” 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998).
109. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732 (2d Cir. 1987).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 733.
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recognized the importance of similarity in interpretations of class
action procedural rules in holding that “a party cannot avoid the
preclusive effect of a denial of class certification . . . [by] pointing to
largely illusory differences between statutes that are designed for
112
essentially identical purposes.” That court discussed how “semantic
differences” in state and federal rules were not “considered” when
courts, both state and federal, determine the preclusive effect of
denials of certification.113 When state class action rules are interpreted
substantially similarly to the federal class action rule, a court may
properly issue an injunction, but only to the narrow extent that the
state rules are similar.
2. Constitutional Implications. Recognizing differences as
merely semantic, however, cannot justify an injunction against all
nationwide classes. Those forums that do offer substantial differences
from Federal Rule 23 will quickly become visible and emerge as class
action magnets. To alleviate the problems of competing putative
classes, then, federal courts must issue injunctions following denials of
certification that are based on an issue that stays the same, regardless
of the forum. That issue is compliance with the United States
Constitution.
Constitutional issues are often implicated in class adjudication,
but courts usually do not undertake an explicit constitutional analysis
when denying certification, relying instead exclusively on Rule 23.114
Failure to mention explicitly the constitutional underpinnings of Rule
112. Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 823 (S.D. Ga. 1987).
113. Id.
114. Failing to decide explicitly the constitutional issue within the context of statutory
review is the preferred method of appellate review. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (“‘[F]ederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious
doubt of their constitutionality.’ Where such ‘serious doubts’ arise, a court should determine
whether a construction of the statute is ‘fairly possible’ by which the constitutional question can
be avoided.” (citations omitted)). This method of relying on statutory interpretation to save an
otherwise unconstitutional statute does not prevent constitutional issues from deciding the
appropriateness of class action relief. Indeed, the Court’s class action jurisprudence often
centers around constitutional issues. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807,
822 (1985) (deciding personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues on constitutional grounds);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1940) (constitutionalizing the adequacy of representation
determination). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 (2000) (describing the
Court’s adequacy of representation requirement as an “embryonic theory” because of the
Court’s issuance of “[f]act-sensitive and rule-dependent decisions that shrink from announcing
any broad constitutional norms,” suggesting that the Justices “effectively whisper ‘Rule 23 does
not authorize that,’ rather than proclaim ‘Due Process forbids that’”).
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23’s requirements, however, should not prevent a federal court from
enjoining putative class plaintiffs from relitigating those same
constitutional issues. Implicit in many denials of certification is a
recognition that any decision rendered by class adjudication would
not be entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process Clauses.115 Professor Edward F. Sherman explains: “In
evaluating case aggregation, perhaps the most compelling concern is
whether the lack of individuation so affects the quality of decisionmaking that it denies fairness and due process. Clearly due process is
116
denied if the aggregated case is unmanageable . . . .” Professor
Sherman then explains that the class action requirements are aimed at
insuring that the case is manageable and that “the jury will be able to
make discriminating judgments without being unduly confused.”117
Aggregative litigation often quickens adjudication, but many
times at the expense of individual concerns. If individualized justice is
obscured by a class action, certifying the class violates the Supreme
Court’s admonition that “the Constitution recognizes higher values
118
than speed and efficiency.” Even if a state court deems efficiency
more important than processing individual defenses or claims, the
Constitution may require otherwise. This basic principle has been
constitutionalized by the Court’s requirement that class
representatives serve the interests of the class before unnamed class

115. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”).
116. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10
REV. LITIG. 231, 251 (1991). Related to manageability is the idea that a class defendant must be
able to defend the lawsuit against individual members of the class. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every
available defense.”); W. Elec. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that denying
the defendants the right to “present a full defense on the issues would violate due process”);
S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex. 2000) (explaining that even within class
actions, “basic to the right to a fair trial—indeed, basic to the very essence of the adversarial
process—is that each party have the opportunity to adequately and vigorously present any
material claims and defenses”).
117. Sherman, supra note 116, at 251. Professor Sherman argues that “[p]laintiffs’ interests
in forum selection, or defendants’ insistence on dealing individually with plaintiffs in a divideand-conquer strategy, may be important to them, but are not fundamental to procedural
justice.” Id. at 253. Far more than just the loss of “strategic advantages,” id., the constitutional
implications of class actions include choice-of-law constraints and the ability to present
individual claims or defenses.
118. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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119
members are bound. In short, adequacy of representation is a
constitutional requirement. If a denial of certification is premised on
fundamental conflicts that exist among class members,120 that decision
rests on not only Rule 23(a), but also the Constitution.
Constitutional guarantees of fairness to defendants may also
mandate a denial of certification. For example, the Court has set
constitutional limits on the choice of law used in class adjudication,
121
requiring that the choice of law not be arbitrary or unfair. The
122
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
prevents a forum state from changing or altering its choice-of-law
rules merely because a case is complex. One commentator explains
why: “Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the
parties’ rights, it should not change simply because, as a matter of
administrative convenience and efficiency, we have combined many
claims in one proceeding . . . .”123
Shortly after the Shutts decision, Professors Arthur R. Miller and
David Crump wrote an influential article explaining the importance
of the constitutional analysis: “The persistence of the magnet forum
problem, after Shutts, may depend upon whether the constitutional
standards are loosely or tightly construed. Loose requirements will
enable the forum to prefer its own policy in derogation of more
124
significant interests in other states.” If a federal court indicates a
desire to have tighter constitutional standards for choice of law and
refuses to certify a class on that basis, the denial of certification is thus
a constitutional one entitled to preclusive effect.

119. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that a party whose interests were adverse to
class representatives could not be bound by a class action judgment).
120. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (decertifying a class
under Rule 23 because of “conflicts of interests” among class members). For an overview of the
adequacy requirement, see generally Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough:
Assuming More Than Merely “Adequate” Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927
(2004).
121. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (requiring that “for a
State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”).
122. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
123. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549
(1996).
124. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class
Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1986).
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With these constitutional choice-of-law constraints on using a
single state’s law to determine the rights and responsibilities of all
parties, many putative class actions, such as the one involved in
125
Bridgestone II, are too unmanageable to certify. The potentially
devastating effects of wide variances in state law are too significant
for a court to ignore or leave to a “kind of Esperanto [jury]
instruction.”126 These important manageability and choice-of-law
concerns will often subsume the Rule 23 requirements, implicitly
making certification a constitutional determination.
Further, these constitutional limits on choice of law include the
requirement that a state court not render another state’s law a nullity
or “abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no
relation to anything done or to be done within them.”127 Yet certifying
a nationwide class action may indeed abrogate a defendant’s rights.
128
Take the Avery case: holding an insurer liable for following the laws
of other states nullifies those laws, not just in Illinois, but also in the
forty-eight states that the certified class purports to serve.129

125. See Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[s]tate consumerprotection laws vary considerably, and courts must respect these differences rather than apply
one state’s law to sales in other states with different rules,” and decertifying a nationwide class
because “a single nationwide class [was] not manageable”). A substantial body of scholarship
has developed around the question of whether nationwide classes can ever be manageable and,
if so, how to circumvent the conflict-of-laws problems. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G.
Bough, Conflict of Laws and Multi-State Class Actions: How Variations in State Law Affect the
Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), 68 UMKC L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Scott Fruehwald,
Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 DAYTON L. REV. 39, 43 (1998); John C.
Anderson, Note, Good “Brick” Walls Make Good Neighbors: Should a State Court Certify a
Multistate or Nationwide Class of Indirect Purchasers?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2019, 2030 (2002);
Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3)
Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 842 (2000).
126. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Appellees see the ‘which law’ matter as
academic. They say no variations in state warranty laws relevant to this case exist. A court
cannot accept such an assertion ‘on faith.’” (footnote omitted)). Justice (then Judge) Ruth
Bader Ginsburg pointed to “the general, unstartling statement made in a leading treatise: ‘The
Uniform Commercial Code is not uniform.’” Id. (quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 7 (2d ed. 1980)). Further, consumer fraud statutes are far from identical.
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 484, 489 (D.N.J.
2000) (“[T]here exist many legal variations between the states’ consumer protection laws.”);
Lyon v. Caterpillar, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 206, 219–20 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that “each state’s
consumer fraud act is unique” and “not uniform”).
127. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1928)).
128. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
129. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
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Professor Scott Fruehwald has argued further that even if class
certification passes choice-of-law muster, it does not necessarily pass
130
due process muster. In the context of punitive damages, the Court
has explained that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on
violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful
conduct in other States.”131 Although the use of due process to limit
132
the size of punitive damages may be constitutionally questionable,
the principle underlying much of the Court’s jurisprudence in this
area—that individual states cannot or, perhaps more appropriately,
should not dictate policy to other states133—applies equally well in the
class action context. Again using Avery as an example, holding an
insurer liable for using generic replacement parts does indeed violate
due process because it forces insurers either to use nongeneric parts,
an expensive practice that many states discourage, or face damages
for the insurer’s practices across the country.
This Note does not purport to define specifically when certifying
a class violates the due process and full faith and credit requirements

130. See Scott Fruehwald, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinstein
on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 358 (2002) (reviewing Simon v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), to conclude that class certification was
permissible under Shutts but not under economic substantive due process).
131. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (holding that a state does not “have a legitimate
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful conduct committed
outside of the State’s jurisdiction”).
132. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“I continue to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive
damages awards.”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
“Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our Nation’s legal
culture (no matter how much in need of correction it may be)” and arguing that the new rule is
“constrained by no principle other than the Justices’ subjective assessment of the
‘reasonableness’ of the award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed”). Under a
vision of private tort law—perhaps the more appropriate role of the court system—restraints on
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause are “more comprehensible.” See John C. P.
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (And the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the debate
over excessive punitive damages has been “misframed,” and that once properly framed—
“Whether a tolerably fair process of adjudication could generate the conclusion that the
Campbells were entitled to extract $145 million from State Farm for what it did to them?”—the
Court’s conclusion that State Farm was denied “minimum standards of fairness [ ] becomes
quite a bit more comprehensible”).
133. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418 (“A basic principle of federalism is that each State may
make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on
a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”).
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of the Constitution. Rather, this argument rests on the fact that
judges making certification decisions implicitly consider these
constitutional requirements. For example, although the putative class
was decertified in Bridgestone I because, inter alia, choice-of-law
134
concerns made the class unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3), this
135
determination was more than just a rule-based one. The Bridgestone
I court explained:
No matter what one makes of the decentralized approach as an
original matter, it is hard to adopt the central-planner model without
violence not only to Rule 23 but also to principles of federalism.
Differences across states may be costly for courts and litigants alike,
but they are a fundamental aspect of our federal republic and must
136
not be overridden in a quest to clear the queue in court.

In the Bridgestone consumer fraud litigation, choice-of-law concerns
made the putative class unconstitutional, and the court’s
determination to decertify the class was thus entitled to preclusive
effect. A denial of certification with constitutional underpinnings
necessarily involves the same issues as later certification decisions,
making the denial proper for injunctive relief regardless of how
137
liberally a state would interpret its own class action requirements.
C. Necessarily Decided?
Courts often deny certification because plaintiffs have failed to
prove a combination of several of the prerequisites to certification.138
In the class action context, a judge is likely to decide the certification
question on numerous fronts, thus implicating the debate on whether

134. See Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because these claims must be
adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not
manageable.”).
135. See id. at 1020 (discussing how applying the “central planning model—one case, one
court, one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved—suppresses information that is vital
to accurate resolution”).
136. Id.
137. Cf. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting 13 (Mar. 12, 2001), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRACMM01.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
State-court certification of the same class, reaching people in many other states, may
take on issues that no court should undertake to address in a class setting. The federal
court, for example, may have been deterred by choice-of-law difficulties; should a
state court be free to ignore the same difficulties, or to presume to resolve them?
138. See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851
(9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he combined difficulties overlapping from each of the elements of Rule
23(a) preclude certification in this case.”).
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a court should grant preclusive effect to an earlier determination that
139
rested on multiple, independent grounds. Because the requirements
of Rule 23 often merge, however,140 a holding that certification is not
proper for failing any, all, or some of the prerequisites should be
treated as a single ground for the decision. One court has taken such
an approach.141
However, some denials of certification may be based on one
particular factor that is easily remediable in another forum. These
denials—if based exclusively on failing that one requirement—should
not have preclusive effect, because a later plaintiff could fix the
certification defect. In such cases, the denial of certification is not
“sufficiently firm.”142 If, however, the denial of certification rests on
both a factor that can later change and one that will not, failing the
latter is enough to warrant preclusive effect for the denial of the
entire putative class.
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements. Rule 23(a) contains four basic
requirements for class actions: numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.143 Of these, numerosity, typicality,
and adequacy of representation are not sufficiently firm to warrant
preclusive effect in every case. For example, a denial of certification
may rest on the fact that “bare allegations,” “unsupported

139. The debate and circuit split is spelled out in Monica Renee Brownewell, Note,
Rethinking the Restatement View (AGAIN!): Multiple Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of
Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (2003).
140. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997):
The adequacy-of-representation requirement “tend[s] to merge” with the
commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which “serve as guideposts for
determining whether . . . maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the
class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13
(1982).
141. In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(giving preclusive effect to another court’s denial of certification on the “cumulative effect” of
23(a) inadequacies without distinguishing among them).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978).
143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
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144
conclusions,” or “mere conjecture”—promises of more putative
class members—will not satisfy the numerosity requirement of
23(a)(1).145 Speculation, of course, may in time become reality;
therefore, injunctive relief is not appropriate when a denial of
certification is based solely on the fact that more plaintiffs have not
materialized. Similarly, when certification is denied on a 23(a)(3)
basis (the named plaintiff has a unique factual relationship with the
defendant), another named plaintiff, without such a relationship,
could be substituted in another forum where certification would be
appropriate. Rule 23(a)(4) presents a trickier situation: the
requirement of adequate counsel and representation can be
remediable in another forum or even in the first court, especially
given the court’s numerous new options for appointing counsel per
23(g).146 Sometimes, however, a class will fail Rule 23(a)(4) because
the interests of the class are too divergent and no representative is
147
adequate. Such a decision would be final.
A decision denying certification on Rule 23(a)(2), which requires
148
that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class,” is
always sufficiently final: no change in circumstances could create a
new common question of law or fact for the decertified class.
Common questions among class members may later arise, however, if
plaintiffs make new claims. Nevertheless, if the other requirements
are met, an injunction preventing class treatment for the first type of
claims is still proper because the class would be enjoined only to the
extent that the certification decision was actually and necessarily
decided. Narrowly defining the scope of the injunction is key. As an
example, plaintiffs may first define a class so broadly—as x—that it
fails to meet the commonality requirement, then later narrow the
class enough—to y—that certification is proper.149 The injunction

144. Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 88 F.R.D. 619, 625 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
145. Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1973).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (g) (describing procedures for appointing class counsel and providing
for the designation of “interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative class”).
147. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (finding a constitutional violation
when the plaintiffs’ class purported to represent people “whose substantial interests [were] not
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they [were] deemed to represent”).
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(2). For (b)(3) classes (i.e., classes seeking damages), the
commonality requirement is essentially a nullity, because common issues must predominate over
individual issues. See id. R. 23 (b)(3); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609 (1997).
149. Some defendants have argued that a class is too broad to meet the commonality
requirement but that, once the class is defined narrowly enough to possess common questions, it
then fails the numerosity requirement. Compare Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 104–06
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would govern a class defined as x, not a class defined as y, and
therefore it would be sufficiently final and would cover the same
issues already decided in the first decision.
2. Rule 23 (b)(3) Requirements: Predominance and Superiority.
Rule 23 (b)(3) damages classes are the most common—and
150
controversial—classes. In addition to requiring common questions
of law or fact, damages classes require that these common questions
“predominate over any questions affecting individual members.”151
Likewise, a class action must be “superior to other available methods
152
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” As with
the analysis under the 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, the (b)(3)
shortcomings of a putative class will not magically disappear if
presented later. More importantly, no amount of new discovery or
better counsel can cure the deficiencies inherent in (b)(3) pitfalls,

(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the position that, once sufficiently narrowed, the class would not
possess common questions), with Kohn v. Mucia, 776 F. Supp. 348, 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying
certification after having narrowed the class to meet the commonality requirement because it
was “only speculation to claim” that the class was sufficiently numerous on the particular factual
record). A denial of certification on this basis would be proper for injunctive relief, but only to
the extent that the court enjoined certification of a class defined too broadly. For example, in
Kohn, a federal court determined that given the commonality requirement any putative class
should include only “those people whose cars were older than seven years and properly
registered when destroyed; who received no notice whatsoever; and whose then current
addresses were on file with the Secretary of State.” Id. If the plaintiffs then filed a putative class
action in a state court with a broader definition, the federal court could properly enjoin them.
However, the Kohn court then determined that this narrow class was not sufficiently numerous
to warrant certification. Id. If plaintiffs could later produce enough putative class members of
this narrow definition to satisfy the numerosity requirement, they could properly pursue a class
action in a different forum. See id. (implying that certification could be granted if the
commonality and numerosity requirements were met).
150. 13 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:9 (4th
ed. 2002) (“Most class actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(3).”); cf. Advisory Comm. on the
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, at 28:
It is safe to say that the eminent authors of [Rule 23(b)(3)] had little conception in
1966 that a mere rule of joinder . . . would become such a prominent feature in the
landscape of modern litigation, dramatically altering the stakes, scale, and outcomes
in certain kinds of class action lawsuits.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
152. Id. In making the (b)(3) determination, a court may consider:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
Id.
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because class-based issues will never predominate over claims with
individualized concerns. Thus, a denial on (b)(3) grounds would be
“sufficiently firm” for the purposes of the relitigation exception to the
153
AIA.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part III.B.2, manageability concerns
and choice-of-law analysis factor heavily into the (b)(3)
determination; certification denials on this basis thus implicate
154
These
constitutional
significant
due
process
concerns.
underpinnings create similar issues for each certification decision,
regardless of whether a state court class action rule would require
predominance or superiority to certify the class.155
D. Timing Issues
A final comment regarding the doctrinal validity of injunctive
relief concerns the timing issues surrounding the federal injunction.
Although rejecting the injunction before it, the Supreme Court in
156
Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, a case not cited by the
Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone II, provided injunction-seeking
litigants a strong foundation for arguments in favor of relief. The
Parsons Steel Court held that an injunction was improper when a
state court had already decided the preclusive effect of a federal court
judgment;157 implicit in this analysis is a recognition that federal courts
may issue injunctions to protect their judgments under the relitigation
exception to the AIA, absent a state court’s determination of the
preclusive effect of the federal decision.158 This holding “creates a
strong incentive” for successful federal litigants to seek a federal

153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978) (“‘[F]inal judgment’ includes
any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to
be accorded conclusive effect.”).
154. See supra notes 114–37 and accompanying text.
155. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 150, § 13:11 (“Not all states, however, require a
showing that a class action be superior. Illinois and Pennsylvania will permit class actions on a
mere showing of appropriateness.”).
156. 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986).
157. See id. (holding that a federal court may not enjoin state court proceedings when “the
prevailing party in the federal suit had litigated in the state court and lost on the res judicata
effect of the federal judgment”).
158. The basic question of Parsons Steel was whether the AIA impliedly limits the Full Faith
and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Court held that the AIA and Full Faith and Credit
Act could be “construed consistently, simply by limiting the relitigation exception of the AntiInjunction Act to those situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on the merits of the
res judicata issue.” Id. at 524.
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injunction against repetitive state actions immediately to avoid
159
litigation of the preclusion issue in state court. Parsons Steel thus
requires that any court issuing a certification-blocking injunction do
so before a state court considers and rejects the preclusive effect of
the federal court denial of certification.160
CONCLUSION
In appropriate circumstances, federal courts can and should issue
injunctions to prevent nationwide class actions in state court. The
effectiveness of these injunctions in solving the problems described,
however, will be severely limited if defendants cannot get to federal
court in the first place. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are already adept at making
class actions “removal-proof”;161 to avoid certification-blocking
injunctions, plaintiffs’ lawyers need only coordinate so that no one
files a removable case. In massive litigation such as Bridgestone II, the
temptation to file lawsuits quickly may result in quite a few “inartful”
complaints that do wind up in federal court. In less obvious class
actions, however, a coordinated plaintiffs’ bar may get a class certified
in state court before a single removable case is ever filed.
This ease of evasion suggests a legislative solution: federalizing
most class actions by allowing removal with only a minimal level of
162
diversity jurisdiction. Such legislation offers a far better solution
159. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 11.2, at 732 (4th ed. 2003); see also
id. (explaining that if the preclusion issue is presented and lost in state court, “it will bar a
subsequent federal injunction,” and that “after Parsons Steel, the person subjected to a
repetitive suit in state court should immediately seek a federal court injunction”).
160. The Bridgestone II court discussed, but did not cite, how one state court, later identified
as Davison v. Ford Motor Co., No. 00-C2298 (8th Cir. Ct. of Tenn. 2000), certified a nationwide
class “the day the complaint was filed, without awaiting a response from the defendants and
without giving reasons,” calling the state court’s certification an “obvious violation of
procedural requirements” that will “ultimately be vacated.” Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765–66
(7th Cir. 2003); see also supra note 84. Because the Davison court certified the class before the
Bridgestone I decertification, it did not consider whether to give the federal decision preclusive
effect. Therefore, although not bearing on the Bridgestone II injunction, the Parsons Steel
limitation could prove important in future cases. Notable, though, is that neither the Seventh
Circuit, nor the district court on remand issuing the injunction specifically to cover the Davison
plaintiffs and their lawyers, undertook this analysis. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S MDL No. 1373, at 1 (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2003)
(clarifying notice in aid of the injunction of July 18, 2003).
161. See Thomas Merton Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solutions
for Class Action Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 507, 511–14 (2000) (discussing
plaintiffs’ tactics to defeat federal jurisdiction).
162. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); Class
Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,
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than injunctive relief, given the limits of the Anti-Injunction Act, the
need to rest denials of certification on constitutional grounds for the
denial to be preclusive, and the difficult problems of establishing what
is and can be precluded. As long as state courts have the power to
adjudicate nationwide class actions, however, federal courts that have
already found class relief inappropriate should, when the
requirements for issue preclusion are met, enjoin putative class
members from relitigating the certification question.

S. 1751, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 483 (advocating
the federalization of nationwide class actions to alleviate state court bias against out-of-state
defendants).

